Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical relevance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population mean-matching), whether time is discrete or continuous, and whether players can specify mixtures or only pure strategies. Comparing point predictions, NE always does better than maximin and often does no worse than Logit QRE. NE predicts better than Center (50-50 mixes) under mean-matching, but otherwise not as well. By contrast, in a dominance solvable game, NE predicts better than alternatives in all treatments. Qualitative and quantitative dynamic models capture regularities across all treatments.
Introduction
Generalized matching pennies games capture the essence of strategic situations (e.g., in hunting, warfare and sports) where the central task for each participant is to outguess opponents.
For example, in the epigraph above, Sherlock Holmes gloats that his own level-3 strategy of exiting at Canterbury bested his archenemy Moriarty's level-2 strategy of engaging a special train, but Holmes recognizes that higher levels are possible. Since level-(k + 1) beats level-k for every positive k in generalized matching pennies, these games suffer from infinite regress, a Gordian knot that blocked progress in game theory for centuries. Von Neumann (1928) finally cut that knot with the idea of mixed strategy equilibrium.
Although mixed strategy equilibrium remains a cornerstone of game theory, it continues to provoke theoretical and empirical controversies. We will see in the next section that theorists have well reasoned doubts about the predictive power of mixed Nash equilibrium, and have proposed alternatives. Applied economists typically focus on pure strategy Nash equilibria when they exist, but turn to mixed NE in games (such as generalized matching pennies) with no pure NE. The empirical evidence supporting those equilibria, however, is itself mixed at best, as has been recognized for over 50 years.
The present paper is motivated by the following research questions. First, under what conditions (if any) does mixed Nash equilibrium do a good job of predicting behavior in generalized matching pennies games? Second, is there a better point prediction -perhaps maximin, as von Neumann proposed, or quantal response equilibrium? Third, can qualitative or quantitative dynamic models explain behavior when it departs from point predictions?
Given the importance and ubiquity of strategic interaction with a matching pennies flavor, the answers to such questions have first order importance for applied social scientists and biologists as well as for theorists.
1
After reviewing some previous literature in Section 2 and some established theory in Section 3, we describe in Section 4 a fresh laboratory examination of games with unique equilibria in mixed strategies. Using a new graphical player screen display for 2x2 bimatrix games, we present two different matching pennies games plus (as a control) a dominance solvable game. Section 4 concludes with lists of testable hypotheses about competing point predictions, about treatment effects on mean choices and on dispersion, and about adaptive learning dynamics.
Section 5 collects results. Some of the point predictions do better than others in some circumstances, but overall none of them predicts very well. We find that the data are generally consistent with a qualitative directional learning model, and that a quantitative regret-based version of directional learning captures some important regularities.
A concluding discussion in Section 6 summarizes our findings and suggests potential implications for game theory and for applied research. Appendices include supplementary data analysis, and instructions to subjects.
Previous literature
Early game theory emphasized two-player zero-sum bimatrix games, where Nash equilibrium and maximin mixed strategies coincide, but recognized that these equilibrium mixes differ in asymmetric matching pennies games (e.g., Solan et al., 2013) . Early theoretical work on fictitious play dynamics (Julia Robinson, 1951; George Brown, 1951) established convergence in the zero-sum case, but Shapley (1964) found some non-zero-sum games with a unique NE in mixed strategies to which such dynamics do not converge. Subsequent generations of theorists have not reached consensus on dynamic stability: Stahl (1988), Crawford (1985) and others showed that convergence to equilibrium generally fails for their favored dynamics in asymmetric matching pennies games, while Hofbauer and Hopkins (2005) , among others, prove convergence for different sorts of dynamics.
These theoretical controversies, for point predictions as well as for dynamics, highlight the need for empirical work. This was recognized long ago, but so far the empirical results have been mixed at best. Rapoport & Orwant (1962) surveyed early laboratory experiments, and found that average play typically was closer to a uniform mix (e.g., 50-50) than to the NE or maximin mix. O'Neill (1987) found that average empirical mixtures were surprisingly close to the NE in a particular zero-sum 4x4 game, but his results were challenged by (James) Brown and Rosenthal (1990) We know of only one previous empirical paper comparing maximin to Nash mixtures. Ochs (1995) considers several treatments (including one that uses a set of 9 explicit mixtures) but finds that neither Nash equilibrium nor maximin tracks the observed changes in average play when game parameters change. Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2003) find that quantal response equilibrium with one free parameter (for logit precision) also fails to track such changes, but adding a second parameter (for risk aversion) improves performance.
There is also an empirical literature on adaptive dynamics in matching pennies games. Mookherjee and Sopher (1994) find that belief learning (responsive to payoffs that would have been earned by strategies not employed) beats rote learning. Erev and Roth (1998) offer a three parameter model to rehabilitate rote learning. Camerer and Ho (1999)'s EWA model includes an extra parameter to hybridize belief learning (a la Friedman and Cheung, 1996) with rote learning; the authors show that it is able to fit a variety of games, including some matching pennies. Tang (1999) presents 3x3 bimatrix game data that favors the Selten (1991) anticipatory dynamics model over the Crawford (1985) model. Stephenson (2019) reports an experimental test of evolutionary models in coordinated attacker-defender games, which include own-population effects (Friedman, 1991 ) not considered in our generalized matching pennies games. His results are consistent with non-sign-preserving adaptive dynamic models.
In sum, despite important prior work by leading game theorists and experimentalists, all three motivating research questions remain open. 3 Theory
Point predictions. Table 1 shows the specific bimatrix games that we will study. The first two, named 8002 and 3117 after their row payoffs, are asymmetric matching pennies games.
The Appendix includes the straightforward computation of the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) and maximin mixed strategies; these games were chosen in part to create separation between those mixtures. The third game, named IDDS because it is dominance solvable, is intended as a control; its unique NE is in pure strategies. At least since Nash (1951), game theorists have recognized two distinct interpretations of equilibrium in 2-player games. In the first interpretation, two highly rational individuals, fully aware of each other's circumstances, make choices (possibly mixtures) that they have no incentive to change. In the second, members of a large row player population match Sign preserving dynamics. In games where each player has only two pure strategies, there is a broad class of adaptive dynamics that applies to both the individualistic and the population interpretations (Friedman, 1991 , Weibull, 1997 , Friedman and Fung, 1996 . The idea is simply that players (individually or collectively) should increase the weight on the pure strategy with currently higher payoff.
To formalize, let the time t (strictly) mixed strategy profile be (a(t), b(t)) for a bimatrix Table 1 .
for the row player(s) and
The dynamic process is sign preserving if, at all interior profiles (a(t),
for both row and column players, the weight a(t) or b(t) on the first pure strategy strictly increases (resp. decreases) whenever it has a strictly higher (resp. lower) payoff than the alternative strategy. This is a minimal property of learning and evolution, satisfied by all standard adaptive dynamics including replicator and perturbed best response.
To see the implications, suppose that dynamics are continuous and sign preserving.
Draw the isoclines D R = 0 and D C = 0, i.e., the lines for which, respectively, row players and column players are indifferent between their pure strategies. These isoclines divide the state space in (a(t), b(t)) ∈ [0, 1] 2 into regions, each with its own implied direction of change. Of course, human subject behavior is noisy, so sign preserving dynamics predicts only that clockwise (CW) will, at least in some treatments in matching pennies games, be the most common direction of change from one observation to the next. 
Regret is defined as the normalized shortfall from maximal payoff,
The model predicts the change in mixture s it = s i,t+1 − s it as a sign-preserving linear function of regret,
The sign function is sign(x) = +1 if x > 0; = 0 if x = 0; and = −1 if x < 0. When
includes some values larger than s it and other values smaller than s it , then the convention is that sign{ŝ it − s it } = 0.
Alternative specifications we consider in the Appendix include best response learning
and pure directional learning
4 Laboratory Implementation
Treatment variables
Our experiment has four treatments. The first is the payoff bimatrix: as noted earlier, we consider two generalized matching pennies games, denoted 8002 and 3117, as well as a dominance solvable game denoted IDDS. A second treatment is the action set. In condition P, subjects use radio buttons to select one of two pure strategies, and the display highlights the current payoffs to both players. In condition M, subjects use a vertical slider to select a mixture of the two strategies, as illustrated in Figure 3 , and the heatmap display indicates the resulting payoffs.
The third treatment concerns time. In the standard discrete time (D) condition, subjects' choices are updated simultaneously at regular time intervals, here 6000 ms. In the continuous time (C) condition, subjects update choices asynchronously in real time, with an imperceptible latency of around 50 ms, and data are recorded every 500 ms. In both conditions, payoffs are accumulated over time, as illustrated in the lower right graph in Figure   3 in condition C. In condition D, the blue area representing payoffs consists of adjoining rectangles of width 6 seconds and height given by the payoff at the chosen profile.
The remaining treatment is the matching protocol. There are always two distinct populations: row players match only with column players and vice-versa. In the standard random pairwise (rp) protocol, each subject interacts directly with only one matched opponent, and subjects are randomly rematched at the beginning of each new period. In the mean matching (mm) protocol, each subject plays against the average choice of all subjects in the other population or, equivalently for bimatrix games, gets the mean payoff over matches with all subjects in the other population. In terms of notation introduced earlier, s −it is the time-t action of a particular randomly assigned opponent in rp, while in mm it is the time-t mean action of all possible opponents. 
Design
The data analyzed below come from 8 sessions detailed in Table 2 . The oTRw software for conducting the experiment is a hybrid of oTree (Chen et al, 2016) and LEEPS lab's Redwood suite, illustrated for the most distinctive treatments in Figure 3 . Subjects are recruited from the LEEPS lab subject pool using a local implementation of ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) . Each session lasts for around 90 minutes, with a 20-minute instruction/practice stage, 60-minute game play stage and 10-minute payment/closing stage. Average payment is about US $17.
Testable Hypotheses
Our design transforms the original research questions into the following testable hypotheses. H1: The time-average observed profile will closely approximate: (H1a) Nash equilibrium, or (H1b) Maximin, or (H1c) Center (.5, .5) , or (H1d) logit quantal response equilibrium for some positive precision parameter.
H2:
The time-average observed profile will be closer to Nash equilibrium: (H2a) under mean matching than under random pairwise matching protocol; (H2b) with mixed strategies allowed than with only pure strategies; and (H2c) in continuous time interaction than in discrete time. For other versions of H2, replace the Nash equilibrium point prediction by an alternative such as Maximin.
H3: There will be less dispersion around the time average observed profile: (H3a) under mean matching than under random pairwise matching protocol; (H3b) with mixed strategies allowed than with only pure strategies; and (H3c) in continuous than in discrete time.
We operationalize dispersion as the geometric mean interquartile range. That is, for d R = 75th percentile -25th percentile of Row mixes in the sample, and d C similarly defined for Column mixes, dispersion is defined as
C . Alternative dispersion measures explored in the Appendix include the harmonic mean,
and the arithmetic mean
. All measures explored give qualitatively similar results.
H4:
In terms of qualitative dynamics, the most frequently observed direction of change will be clockwise (CW) in all treatments in generalized matching pennies games. In pure strategy discrete time (PD) treatments, diagonal (DD) will also be frequently observed.
H5:
In the quantitative learning model (2), the coefficient estimate β 1 will be significantly positive in all treatments. That estimate will be more positive for mean matching than for random pairwise matching, and also more positive for pure than for mixed strategy treatments.
Results
To gain perspective before reporting hypothesis tests, we examine a few examples raw data.
Each panel in Figure 4 In testing point predictions, it is appropriate to focus on settled behavior, so subsequent analysis drops first period in each block, and first 18 seconds (or 3 subperiods) of each period.
For the remaining part of each remaining period in a given matching, we collapse the time path to its time average profile (m R , m C ), and look at the distribution over all instances for Table 4 summarizes tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3; robustness checks using both mean and median profiles can be found in the Appendix.
Point Predictions
Excluding the initial periods and seconds as noted earlier, for each instance (matching and period) τ , we compute the time average profile (a τ , b τ ) and its Euclidean distance
5 from a given point prediction (a p , b p ). For example, the first line of the Table 3 shows that for mean matching instances in the 3117 game (pooling over Continuous and Discrete time, and over Pure and Mixing action sets), the mean distance in the action space between the time-average profile and the NE prediction is just 0.157, and according to the two sample t-test, this is significantly less than 0.224, the mean distance between those same time average profiles and the Center point. The same line in the table
shows that the mean distance to the maximin prediction, 0.398, is significantly larger.
Thus the first lines of Panels A and B in Table 3 support Hypothesis H1a, that NE is the best point prediction, for mean-matching treatments in generalized matching pennies games.
Consistent with Hypothesis H1c, Center is best in all other treatments in these games, with 13 Testing Hypothesis H1d is potentially more complicated, since there is a whole arc of QRE that connect NE to Center, not just a single point prediction. However, as shown in the Appendix and Figure 1 , that arc usually bends away from the mean profiles, and the closest point on the arc is typically very close to either NE or Center in all treatments. We therefore conclude that our data do not support Hypothesis H1d.
For the same empirical time average profiles, Table 4 shows the results of regressing treatment dummies and their interactions on prediction error and on dispersion. Hypothesis H2 asserts that relevant predictions are more accurate for certain treatments. The first column of Table 4 supports Hypothesis H2a, that NE is more accurate under mean matching than under random pairwise matching. Conclusions regarding H2b and H2c are more nuanced due to significant interactions: the direct effect of pure strategies and of mean matching both reduce NE prediction error while continuous time increases prediction error, but these are largely offset by the interactions of mean matching with continuous and pure. The upshot is that NE predicts especially well in mixed mean-matching treatments, confirming the impression from the previous Table. The entries in the second column confirm that maximin prediction errors are large in all treatments. Many treatments and interactions have opposite signs in the first and third columns, suggesting that they shift the observed behavior away from NE and towards Center, or the reverse.
Hypothesis 3 concerns dispersion. The last column of Table 4 reports the geometric mean of row dispersion (IQR) and column dispersion (IQR) as defined in the previous section. The second line of the Table supports H3b, that dispersion is less with mixed strategies. The significantly negative coefficient in line 8 offers limited support for H3a: mean matching reduces dispersion in pure strategy treatments but perhaps not in general. The Table does not support H3c; dispersion seems to be about the same for Continuous as for Discrete time treatments.
Qualitative Dynamics
The large constant term in the last column of Table 4 suggests that behavior typically does not settle down to a behavioral equilibrium. Does that mean that players wander aimlessly, or is there some regularity such as clockwise cycles?
To investigate, recall how Figure 2 classified profile moves ∆s t = (∆s Rt , ∆s Ct ) = (s Rt+1 − s Rt , s Ct+1 − s Ct ) = 0 as clockwise (CW), diagonal (DD), counterclockwise (CCW), or counter diagonal (CD). Figure 6 shows how the classifications change over time in random pairwise matching sessions. For example, in the top panels we see that in the 15 six-second subperiods), there is a preponderance of CW moves (in red), a fair number of DD moves, no CD moves (impossible in Pure treatments), rather few CCW moves, and perhaps 10 -30% Stay (∆s t = 0). Indeed, in all treatments CW is more common than other moves, as predicted by sign preserving dynamics. It is no surprise that Stay is far more common and DD is relatively rare in Continuous treatments, since the time interval there is just half a second. CCW is especially rare in Pure Continuous sessions. CD is rare even in mixed treatments. DD is not uncommon in discrete time treatments, where it may indicate anticipatory behavior in the sense of Selten (1991) . There seem to be no strong trends in behavior within periods, nor major differences between 8002 and 3117 games. There is, however, considerable heterogeneity across matched pairs, as can be seen from the by-pair breakdown in Appendix Figure 10 . The data shown here (and in the Appendix, e.g., Tables 8 and 9 ) thus support Hypothesis H4. Overall, CW moves are indeed the most prevalent, representing up to half of total observations. DD often ranks second, and other directional moves are relatively rare. Move types have similar distributions in the two generalized matching pennies bimatrices and (if we ignore Stay) in continuous time and discrete time. The distributions also seem roughly similar in pure and mixed strategy conditions and in mean matching and random pairwise.
Fitted Dynamic Model
To test the more quantitative dynamic hypothesis H5, we fit the regret-based learning model (2) allowing for fixed effects and for treatment-specific response to regret, (3) and (4), with results generally consistent with those of Table 5 .
To complement the hypothesis tests, we ran simulations of equation 5 using the coefficient estimates reported in Table 5 with error terms set to zero. Figure 8 (cf the 3D version, Figure 11 in the Appendix) shows that, according to the fitted models, players (or populations) move in clockwise cycles that very gradually contract towards a limit cycle surrounding the Nash equilibrium. Thus the data suggest that, practically speaking, there will never be convergence to any point prediction, but rather that (a) cycles will persist for a very long time, and (b) Nash equilibrium is a crude approximation of the long-run time-average profile.
Discussion
The hypothesis test results suggest answers to the broad research questions concerning generalized matching pennies, i.e., concerning strategic situations with equilibrium only in mixed strategies. First, we find that mixed Nash equilibrium is a reasonably good predictor of behavior in population games. That is, when players interact with entire groups of other players, not just a single player, our results for matching pennies games suggest that the 21 players tend to sort themselves out so that overall realized strategies approximate the Nash equilibrium mixture.
Second, popular alternative point predictions, such as maximin or Quantal Response Equilibrium (for a fixed precision parameter) did not improve on Nash equilibrium in any of our treatments. However, the atheoretic prediction Center (all actions equally likely) predicts time-average behavior better than Nash equilibrium under most treatments involving pairwise matches, especially in discrete time and with pure strategy choices only.
Another negative result deserves emphasis. None of the point predictions does well in predicting behavior at a given moment of time in pairwise matchings, due to persistent dispersion around the time average behavior.
The corresponding positive result is that there is order beneath the dispersion. Although it is easier to see in some treatments (e.g., mixed strategies or population means in continuous time) than in others, there is a clear tendency for play to cycle in generalized matching pennies games. Typically one player (or player population) has a stronger incentive to switch strategies, and doing so gives the same incentive to the other player population, creating (with our sign conventions) clockwise cycles. In discrete time treatments we saw some evidence that players tried to anticipate and exploit these regularities, but they nevertheless persist, especially in continuous time and in population games.
Possible future lab experiments involve mixed strategy elicitation and convergence improvements. In our experiments, subjects explicitly choose their mixed strategies and are paid by the expected payoff given the strategy profiles, which removes the need to randomize actions dynamically. Conversely, Romero and Rosokha (2018) elicit subjects' historydependent actions in repeated prisoners' dilemma. That elicitation allows a closer look at subjects' repeated game strategies and could be applied to matching pennies games. Another direction is to seek new treatments that facilitate convergence to Nash equilibrium or other point predictions. In pilot sessions, we tried adding indicators showing best and worst possible payoffs and slowing adjustment speed in continuous time, but found little impact.
We hope that our work encourages game theorists to take adaptive dynamics more seriously, and to model how they respond to different sorts of treatments such as those considered in this paper. Even more, we hope that our results encourage applied researchers to work in a more nuanced fashion with mixed strategy equilibrium. Biologists since Lotka and Volterra (Lotka, 1925) have recognized that dynamics are crucial to understanding generalized matching pennies interactions such as between predators and prey. Social scientists may benefit from similar thinking. For example, 'hot spot' dispatch of law enforcement resources (e.g., Lazzati and Menichini, 2016) is a generalized matching pennies population game, and our work suggests how adaptive dynamics could supplement equilibrium analysis.
Appendix Computation of NE, Maximin and QRE for 8002 games
In this section we use 8002 games as an example to show the computation of NE, Maximin and QRE curve in Table 1 and Figure 1 .
To calculate Nash equilibrium, recall from sign preserving dynamics that we calculated D R (t) and D C (t), which show the payoff difference between pure strategies for row and column players, respectively. By definition, the unique mixed Nash equilibrium can be solved by
As a result, (a N E , b N E ) = (0.5, 0.2).
To calculate Maximin for row players, recall f R (a, b) from equation (1).
The Maximin problem for row players is the following:
For these linear functions of a, the max must occur where f R (a, 1) = f R (a, 0), yielding
Similarly, we can construct the optimization problem for column players and
To calculate QRE curve for both players, the logit payoff response function is 8002 games is as follows.
When λ → 0, we have (a, b) = (.5, .5). When λ → ∞, we have (a, b) = (a N E , b N E ) = (.5, .2). The arc curve between two extreme cases in shown in Figure 1 24
Point prediction details From left to right: 8002 games, 3117 games.
(1) 
